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Abstract
Using public data (Forbes Global 2000) we show that the asset sizes for the largest global firms follow a Pareto distribution
in an intermediate range, that is ‘‘interrupted’’ by a sharp cut-off in its upper tail, where it is totally dominated by financial
firms. This flattening of the distribution contrasts with a large body of empirical literature which finds a Pareto distribution
for firm sizes both across countries and over time. Pareto distributions are generally traced back to a mechanism of
proportional random growth, based on a regime of constant returns to scale. This makes our findings of an ‘‘interrupted’’
Pareto distribution all the more puzzling, because we provide evidence that financial firms in our sample should operate in
such a regime. We claim that the missing mass from the upper tail of the asset size distribution is a consequence of shadow
banking activity and that it provides an (upper) estimate of the size of the shadow banking system. This estimate–which we
propose as a shadow banking index–compares well with estimates of the Financial Stability Board until 2009, but it shows a
sharper rise in shadow banking activity after 2010. Finally, we propose a proportional random growth model that
reproduces the observed distribution, thereby providing a quantitative estimate of the intensity of shadow banking activity.
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Introduction
If we take the Forbes Global 2000 list as a snapshot of the global
economy (see Materials and Methods), we find that financial firms
dominate the top tail of the distribution of firms by asset size: the
highest placed firm classified as non-financial is General Electric,
which ranks 44th in the 2013 Forbes Global 2000 (FG2000) list.
General Electric is also the highest placed non-financial firm in the
2013 Fortune 500 list, which covers only the US economy, where
it ranks 11th. This seems to be a recent trend: General Electric was
the largest non-financial firm by asset size also in the 2004 FG2000
list and in the Fortune 500 list of 1995, but then it ranked 22nd
and 3rd, respectively. Firm size can also be measured by other
variables such as total sales, number of employees, or market
value. However, these can be strongly affected by the fluctuations
in market prices, and by the conditions of labor and financial
markets; this is why we consider assets value a sounder proxy for
the firm size. Financial firms form approximately 30% of the firms
in the FG2000 list, and account for approximately 30% of the total
sales, profits and market value, a share that has been roughly
constant in the whole period 2003–2012 studied. Yet, financial
firms account for 70% of total assets in the 2004 FG2000 list, a
share that rose to 87% in the 2013 list.
Besides being remarkable in themselves, the sizes of the biggest
financial firms also display a peculiar distribution: the 12th largest
firm in the 2013 FG2000 list is the Royal Bank of Scotland with
$2.13 trillion in assets, which is comparable to the UK’s gross
domestic product ($2.4 trillion). Yet its size is not much smaller
than the largest firm in the list, Fannie Mae, which has assets
worth $3.2 trillion. This observation contrasts with the common
view in the literature documented across countries and over time
(see [1–3]) that firm sizes S follow a Paretian distribution as
ProbfS§xg^cx{c, ð1Þ
with c,cw0.
Fig. 1 shows that the rank plot of the firms included in the 2004,
2007 and 2013 lists of FG2000 follows Eq. (1), with an exponent c
close to one, corresponding to Zipf’s law [1], only from the 20th
largest company downward. The upper tail, which is entirely
dominated by financial firms, levels off. If Zipf’s law were to hold
also for the top 20 companies, we would expect Fannie Mae to be
ten times as large as the Royal Bank of Scotland ($21.3 instead of
$3.2 trillion).
This anomaly in the shape of the top tail of the assets
distribution is the starting point of our analysis.
From a theoretical point of view, the occurrence of power laws
(i.e. Pareto distributions) in the size distribution of firms has been
related to proportional random growth (PRG) models [3–5]. In
what follows, we shall first enquires whether departures from the
PRG model’s prediction may be due to an anomalous dynamic of
financial firms that dominate the upper tail of the distribution. We
conclude that the available data suggest that PRG should hold for
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financial firms. The analysis therefore provides a theoretical
framework which allows us to calculate the hypothetical distribu-
tion of assets in the absence of any anomaly. Next, we argue that
the difference between this hypothetical distribution and the actual
one can be taken as a proxy for the size of the so-called shadow
banking system, which has been broadly defined as credit interme-
diation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking
system (see [6], p. 3), and is the subject of much debate at the time
of writing [7,8]. Finally we discuss a simple generalization of the
model proposed in Ref. [5], which allows a first investigation of the
determinants of the observed anomaly.
Results
Proportional Random Growth Model
The observed Paretian distribution has generally been related to
a mechanism of PRG which assumes that firms grow proportion-
ally to their size (see [3] p. 259, for more details). In particular, a
key empirical testable hypothesis of PRG models is that the rate of
return on assets (i.e. the ratio of total profits to total assets) is
independent of the level of assets, as it should be for industries with
constant returns to scale. Firms in the financial sector are indeed
expected to obey constant returns to scale. Our analysis of the
FG2000 sample corroborates this hypothesis: the left panel in
Figure 2 provides evidence for the flat relationship between the
rates of return on assets for the years 2011 and 2012
(corresponding to the 2012 and 2013 lists of FG2000) and the
level of total assets for most of the range of the assets distribution.
In spite of this behavior of the rates of return on assets, the
expected level of (relative) assets of firms at period t conditioned on
the level of (relative) assets at period t{1, is proportional to the
latter only in an intermediate range. As shown in the right panel of
Figure 2, while banks of intermediate size grow proportionally to
their size, the largest ones grow less than linearly (see caption of
the figure). These findings are consistent with earlier results in [9]
and [10].
The estimate of the rates of return shows no evidence of
decreasing returns to scale for financial firms, thereby lending
support to the PRG mechanism. However, the bending in the
estimated expected level of assets highlights how the PRG
inexplicably does not hold for the largest financial firms (more
or less the top 13% in the 2013 list). This finding is reflected in the
distribution of asset sizes of financial firms, reported in the left
panel of Fig. 3, which follows a power law distribution in an
intermediate range, but consistently bends downwards in the top
tail. Such deviation from a theoretical power law behavior is much
sharper than that occurring in the distribution of all firms
(reported in the right panel of Fig. 3).
[11] observed that Zipf’s law (as with power laws in general)
holds as a property of a system as a whole, but it may not hold for
its parts. As such, it is manifest in samples that preserve a form of
coherence (with the whole system), but fails to hold in incomplete
samples that account for only part of the system (see [11]). Our
findings of deviations from a power law behavior for financial
firms which are more pronounced than for the whole economy,
indicate that the Pareto distribution of asset sizes should be
considered as a property that applies to the whole economy, rather
than to a particular sector. This is consistent with empirical
findings e.g. in [1], and suggests that, in the absence of anomalies,
one should expect a hypothetical assets distribution that would
perfectly obey the PRG predictions up to the largest firms.
Table 1 reports the ranges considered in the estimate of the
power law distribution, and the estimate of the Pareto exponent c
of Eq. (1) for all firms in the FG2000 list from 2004 to 2013 (2005
is missing for lack of data). The estimated Pareto exponent for the
whole sample c^ peaks at the beginning of the period and steadily
decreases until it reaches the lowest level in 2007 (2008 list), before
the financial crisis. Then it increases suddenly in 2008 and remains
relatively stable thereafter. Table 1 also reports the estimate of the
Pareto exponent of the distribution of financial firms c^fin: c^fin is
smaller than c^ but it exhibits a behavior similar to c^, with the
important exception that it starts to decline again after the crisis.
The estimated exponents c^ and c^fin are both less than one for
the whole period. The simplest PRG model predicts a Pareto
exponent larger than one [3]; however Bouchaud and Mezard [4]
argue that cv1 can be obtained within models of PRG with
random shocks and trading of assets among firms if this trading is
restricted in size and happens within a sparse network. Malevergne
et al. [5] provide a different mechanism of PRG which explicitly
accounts for the entry and exit of firms. In their paper an exponent
smaller than one characterizes an economy where the accumu-
lated resources of the economy are not channeled to investment in
new enterprises but rather reinvested in existing firms [5].
The Shadow Banking Index
Shadow banking (SB) is a relatively new concept; the term itself
is attributed to Paul McCulley [12]. SB is a part of the wholesale
money market where, in contrast to the regular banking system, it
is not the central bank, but, at least in theory, private institutions
that provide a backstop when necessary. This explains why SB has
remained outside regulation (see, however, [13]). During the
2007–08 crisis, which is often described as a run on the SB system
[14], this private guarantee proved insufficient, and without
massive public intervention the collapse of the SB system would
have brought down the whole global financial system. The first
taxonomy of the different institutions and activities of SB was
given by Pozsar [15], who also constructed a map to describe the
flow of assets and funding within the system. The rise of a large
part of SB was motivated by regulatory and tax arbitrage, and as
such represented the answer of the finance industry to regulation,
Figure 1. Rank plot of the 2004 list (z), 2007 list (%) and 2013
list () of FG2000 by asset size. Financial firms are shown in blue,
while the other firms in red. The straight line corresponds to Zipf’s law
and is drawn for comparison.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.g001
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in particular to capital requirements. Other components respond-
ed to a real economic demand for different types of financial
intermediation [16]. Irrespective of the shortcomings or merits of
the system, it is still true that shadow banking has remained by and
large unregulated, its systemic risks implications uncharted, and its
connections with the rest of financial system opaque. Indeed SB is,
at the time of writing, one of the most important issues on the
agenda of financial reform [7,8].
For us, the only property of interest of the SB system is its total
volume. Estimates of its size differ in nature: Gravelle and Lavoie
[17] distinguish between two broad approaches to measuring the
SB sector, one which is based on identifying the entities that
contribute to it, and the other based on mapping the activities that
constitute it. They also differ quantitatively, because of the
difficulty to determine precisely which financial activities should be
included in the calculation. For example, the Deloitte Shadow
Banking Index [18] shows a rise of the SB system in the US before
2008, but then displays a dramatic drop, suggesting that the
phenomenon is now over. The index is built from specific
components which are known to have played a major role in the
crisis, and its decline after 2008 reflects the deflation of these
markets. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) estimates that SB
‘‘[…] grew rapidly before the crisis, rising from $26 trillion in 2002
to $62 trillion in 2007. The size of the total system declined slightly
Figure 2. Left panel: non-parametric estimate of the relationship between the rates of return on assets and the levels of assets
(bold line, dotted lines refer to 5% confidence interval). Right panel: estimate of the stochastic kernel (i.e. of the conditional probability
distribution), and of the expected level of assets in 2012 conditioned on the level of assets in 2011 (light grey lines and bold blue line respectively).
Both plots refer to financial firms in the 2012 and 2013 FG2000 lists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.g002
Figure 3. Cumulative distribution ProbfS§xg of asset sizes S for financial (left panel) and all (right panel) firms in 2003, 2006, and
2012 (2004, 2006, and 2013 of FG2000 lists). The straight line is obtained as a linear fit in an intermediate range of log ProbfS§xg vs logx (see
Table 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.g003
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in 2008 but increased subsequently to reach $67 trillion in 2011’’
[6].
Below we propose an index for the size of the SB system,
denoted by ISB, based on the idea that, in an ideal economy where
finance operates in a regime of constant return to scale, the power
law distribution should extend all the way to the largest firms.
Since the top tail of the distribution is dominated by financial
firms, we are led to attribute the mass missing from the distribution
of asset sizes to ‘‘[…] credit intermediation involving entities and
activities outside the regular banking system’’ [6], i.e. to shadow
banking. Fitting the middle range of the distribution to a power
law behavior (as in the left panel of Fig. 3) leads us to a theoretical
estimate S^½k of what the size of the kth largest firm should be.
Summing the difference between this theoretical estimate and the
actual size S½k of the kth largest firm, over k, i.e.:
ISB~
XN
k~1
S^½k{S½k
 
ð2Þ
provides our estimate of the size of the SB system. The sum is
limited to the N largest firms. We take N~1000 but the results
depend very weakly on the choice of N as long as S½N is in the
range ½S{,Sz over which the fit is made, because S^½k^S½k
within this range.
For comparison, Fig. 4 reports also the estimated size of the SB
system by FSB [19]. Both their estimate and ISB show a strong rise
before the crisis in 2007, a drop in 2008 (much more severe for
ISB), and a growth after 2008, with ISB increasing at a faster pace,
especially in 2011.
Ref. [17] argues that an entity-based approach to SB, such as
that of the FSB, ‘‘[…] may omit SB activities undertaken by banks
that may contribute to systemic risk.’’ Furthermore, as observed by
Adrian et al. [20] ‘‘[…] the shadow banking system comprises
many different entities and activities. In addition, the types of
entities and activities which are of particular concern will change
in the future, in response to new regulations’’. Along similar lines,
Pozsar et al [14] conclude: ‘‘[…] the reform effort has done little to
address the tendency of large institutional cash pools to form
outside the banking system. Thus, we expect shadow banking to be
a significant part of the financial system, although almost certainly
in a different form, for the foreseeable future’’. These arguments
suggest that the FSB estimate is likely to provide a lower bound to
the size of the SB system. ISB may instead be considered as a
theoretical upper bound, as it measures the amount of assets that are
missing from a hypothetical economy in which PRG holds across
all scales of asset sizes.
A few comments are in order about ISB:
N ISB is a genuine systemic indicator, as it depends on a collective
property of the economy. It is hard to manipulate and simple
to compute, as it requires only data publicly available.
N ISB does not rely on a detailed list of entities and/or activities
which contribute to the SB system; it is therefore robust to
change in regulation and fiscal policy.
N ISB implicitly attributes SB activities to the largest financial
firms which populate the top tail of assets distribution. It is well
documented that the main financial firms originated most of
the SB activities before the crisis [13]. Yet, ISB also crucially
depends on the exponent c, whose estimate depends on the
shape of the distribution in the intermediate range. In
particular, ceteris paribus, ISB is expected to increase if the
exponent c decreases and vice-versa.
Table 1. The range of assets (in billion $) ½S{,Sz where the power law behavior is estimated (for the whole sample), and the
estimated Pareto exponents c^ both for the whole sample and limited to the financial firms in the FG2000 lists from 2004 to 2013
(data for 2005 are not available).
List FG2000 S{ Sz c^ c^fin
2004 14.88 665.14 0.926 0.710
(0.0012) (0.0019)
2006 11.02 897.85 0.889 0.678
(0.0005) (0.0013)
2007 12.18 992.27 0.871 0.645
(0.0005) (0.0012)
2008 12.18 1096.63 0.864 0.655
(0.0006) (0.0016)
2009 14.88 1339.43 0.899 0.672
(0.0008) (0.0012)
2010 14.88 1339.43 0.891 0.674
(0.0008) (0.0011)
2011 18.17 1339.43 0.899 0.669
(0.0006) (0.0013)
2012 24.53 1635.98 0.905 0.648
(0.0009) (0.0012)
2013 24.53 1998.20 0.897 0.627
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Standard errors of the estimated Pareto exponents are reported in brackets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.t001
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Figure 4. Comparison between our index of SB, ISB, with the estimate of the size of SB made by FSB [19] for the period 2003–2012.
The reported confidence bands for our estimate of SB are calculated on the basis of +2 standard errors in the estimate of the coefficients of the
power law distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.g004
Figure 5. Comparison between the observed (cross) and the simulated (bold line) distributions for 2012. Inset: the estimate of l in the
period 2005–2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.g005
The Interrupted Power Law and Shadow Banking
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A comparison between Table 1 and Fig. 4 shows how ISB is
(anti)correlated with c^ and c^fin: when the assets distribution gets
broader (i.e. c and cfin decrease), ISB increases and vice-versa. After
the 2007–08 crisis, the correlation of ISB with c^fin is much stronger
than with c^. This is a further indication that the behavior of
financial firms is at the core of the dynamics of ISB.
A Simple Proportional Random Growth Model with
Shadow Banking
Malevergne et al. [5] discuss a simple PRG model which displays
a Paretian distribution. In their notation [5], firms grow according
to a log-normal stochastic process with drift m and variance s, they
disappear from the market according to a Poisson point process at
rate h, and new firms enter the market at rate n. In the following
we neglect the possibility of an exogenous growth of economy (i.e.
we take c0~d~0 in the notation of [5]), and we assume that all
new firms have initial size equal to one. Malevergne et al. [5] show
that the top tail of the equilibrium size distribution has a power
law shape with a Pareto exponent given by Eq. (7) in Ref. [5]:
c~
1
2
1{2
m
s2
 
z
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1{2
m
s2
 2
z8
h
s2
r" #
: ð3Þ
We introduce a modification of the original model, in order to
reproduce the cut-off displayed by the Forbes data, i.e. in the
presence of SB. According to a Poisson point process at rate l, the
largest firm i in the economy (with size Si~maxi Si ) moves a
fraction of its assets outside the regular banking system to the SB
system, reducing its observed size to (1{ )Si . The parameter l is
therefore a proxy for the intensity of the activity feeding the SB
system.
Table 2 reports a calibration of the parameters of the modified
PRG model for the period 2005–2012 based on the FG2000 list of
firms (see caption of the table). We set ~0:1 and we located the
value of l that yields the best match between the simulated and the
observed firm size distributions (see caption of Table 2). Figure 5
shows the quality of our calibration of the model for 2012. The
same fitting procedure was performed for different values of ; for
[ 0,0:1ð Þ the ‘‘flux’’ l of capital flow into the SB system results
independent of . This is reasonable, because when is very small
and l very large, wealth is repeatedly drawn into the SB system
from the same firm (the largest one).
According to the estimate of l reported in Table 2, the intensity
of SB activity peaked in 2007 before the financial crisis, when the
originate-to-distribute activities implemented by asset-backed securi-
ties and other credit derivatives probably reached their zenith
[14]. In 2008 and 2009 the SB activity showed a dramatic fall in
agreement with the sharp decline in all economic activities and the
supposed breakdown of the SB system; but from 2010 to 2012 we
observe a renewed increase, even though not at pre-crisis rates.
This dynamic is fully consistent with the evolution of the size of SB
system reported in Fig. 4, being l a proxy for the intensity of the
activity feeding the SB system. Considering that the largest firm is
of the order of $ 3 trillion in 2013, our result l&1:2 suggests a
flow of capital into the SB system that is currently progressing at
approximately $ 3.5 trillions a year.
Conclusions and Outlook
This paper takes a non-standard approach to studying the
properties of an economy. Based on solid evidence in the literature
[3], we consider the Pareto distribution for asset sizes as an
empirical law of an economy. The observation of power law
distributions in economics is a remarkably solid piece of empirical
evidence, dating back to the work of Pareto [21]. This empirical
law arises from a generic mechanism – proportional random
growth – that is expected to work in particular for financial firms.
The actual distribution of firm sizes, at the global scale, closely
follows this empirical law in the middle range, but deviates
markedly from it in the upper tail, which is populated entirely by
financial firms. We invoke SB as the element that would reconcile
observations with the expected law. This allows us to derive an
index that identifies the size of SB with the missing mass in the top
tail of the asset size distribution. This approach resembles the one
leading astrophysicists to invoke dark matter and dark energy in order
to reconcile empirical observations with the law of gravitation
(current estimates suggest that dark matter and dark energy
account for approximately 95% of the total mass in the universe).
Likewise, the observation of a truncated power law in the
distribution of asset sizes, points to the existence of dark assets that
account for the missing mass in the top tail of the distribution.
Our estimate of the SB size is silent about the precise nature of
SB activities and entities, as well as about the mechanisms that
Table 2. Estimates of the parameters of the modified PRG model of the SB system for the period 2005–2012 based on the FG2000
list of firms.
Year m s c h l
2005 0.12 0.20 0.89 0.10 0.1 18
2006 0.10 0.24 0.87 0.09 0.1 15
2007 0.15 0.22 0.86 0.13 0.1 20
2008 0.11 0.28 0.90 0.10 0.1 12
2009 0.04 0.21 0.89 0.04 0.1 6
2010 0.11 0.23 0.90 0.10 0.1 14
2011 0.10 0.17 0.91 0.09 0.1 13
2012 0.09 0.17 0.90 0.08 0.1 12
m and s are calculated by yearly variations of the firms’ asset size between consecutive years, except for 2005 we use data of 2003, instead of 2004 which is missing.
Using these values, h is computed from the estimate of the Pareto index c, inverting Eq. (3). The reported value of l is the one that minimizes the distance between the
observed and the simulated firm size distributions. Specifically, i) we compute Zk~S log Sk=S0k
 
T with Sk being the k-th largest firm in the simulation, S0k the k-th
largest firm in the FG2000 list and S :T is the average over 100 simulations. ii) We find l that minimizes the mean square deviation
P
k (Zk{
Z)2=N , with Z~
P
k Zk=N .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094237.t002
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generate the observed departure from the theoretical power law
behavior. The missing mass from the top tail of the distribution
does not necessarily correspond to hidden assets. It may rather
refer to assets being redistributed within the system. The creation
of Special Investment Vehicles in the securitization process is one
example of a mechanism that transfers assets from large banks in
the top tail to the bulk of the distribution.
The index is based on a simple and robust statistical feature,
that is expected to characterize the collective behavior of an
economy. Andrew Haldane [22] recently argued that monitoring
and regulation based on a detailed classification of financial
activities is unlikely to keep pace with the rate of innovations in the
financial industry. The increase in complexity of financial markets
should rather be tamed by measures based on simple metrics. The
index of SB proposed in this paper is a contribution in this
direction.
Our study also raises a number of issues. We conjecture that
China’s financial sector may account, at least in part, for the
disparity between our index of SB and the estimate reported by the
FSB. Indeed, S&P estimated that the outstanding Chinese SB
credit totaled $3.8 trillion by the end of 2012, which is 34% of on-
balance-sheet loans and 44% of China’s GDP [23]. This estimate
is 5.6 times larger than the FSB estimate of China’s SB in 2011.
The latest report of FSB [19] at the time of writing acknowledges
the rapid growth in asset size of ‘‘Other Financial Intermediaries’’
in China (by 42%) as well as in emerging market jurisdictions.
Chinese firms are rapidly growing in an environment that, in turn,
is also changing very quickly, with features not always transparent
or well understood (see, e.g., [23]).
On the theoretical side, inspired by Ref. [16], in Section we
discuss a PRG model reproducing the observed behavior of the
largest financial firms based on an originate-to-distribute activity, by
which firms at the top of the distribution of firm sizes shift part of
their assets off-balance-sheet, e.g. with the creation of Special
Purpose Vehicles. Within this framework, we estimate the intensity
of SB activity in 2005–2012, which largely agrees with the
observed behavior of the SB system. In this respect, one promising
direction of research which may provide clues to the roˆle of
finance in our global economy is to study the relationship between
the fast growth of financial firms relative to non-financial firms and
the proliferation of financial instruments, as in Ref. [24].
Materials and Methods
Here we provide some discussion of the data used, which is
publicly available at http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/
(FG2000) and at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500/2013/full_list/ (Fortune 500). The FG2000 list refers
to the previous year. Thus the 2013 FG2000 list collects firms
according to their characteristics in 2012. In the present paper the
financial sector includes all the firms that in the FG2000 list belong
to the following industries: Banking, Diversified Financials,
Insurance, Consumer Financial Services, Diversified Insurance,
Insurance Brokers, Investment Services, Major Banks, Regional
Banks, Rental & Leasing, Life & Health Insurance, Thrifts &
Mortgage Finance, Property & Casualty Insurance. Their number
ranges from 501 in the 2013 list to 597 in the 2008 list.
2004 is the first year we could find for the FG2000 list and 1995
is the first year when Forbes 500 began to include also financial
firms. Even though it is classified as non-financial, General Electric
is one of the largest issuers of commercial paper in the US and
over 80% of its assets are in the financial sector. Other non-
financial firms that appear at the top of the list belong to the car
industry, telecommunications and energy. While Ford and
General Motors dropped by more than 100 places in the list by
asset size, Volkswagen climbed from 108th to 74th. Vodafone also
declined from 56th in 2004 to 125th in the 2013 list (by asset size).
Oil and gas companies (BP, Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell), on the
other hand, kept a remarkably stable position around the 85th
place.
Assets of the non-financial firms in FG2000 totaled approxi-
mately $20 trillion both in the 2004 and 2013 lists, whereas the
total assets of financial firms in FG2000 list increased steadily from
$48 trillion in 2004 to $138 trillion in 2013, twice the world’s
GDP. This trend is called financial deepening in Ref. [25], to which
we refer for a discussion on the systemic implication of the growth
in the size of banks.
All computations were made in R, see Ref. [26]. All datasets
and codes are available upon request. In particular, the
nonparametric estimate reported in the left panel of Figure 2 (a
Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression) was made with the R package
[27]. The estimate of the stochastic kernel (i.e. of the conditional
probability distribution) in the right panel of Figure 2 was obtained
using the adaptive kernel estimation discussed in Ref. [28].
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